51 The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and 52 Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical 53 leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, 54 test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to 55 advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsi-56 bilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical 57 standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national 58 security-related information in federal information systems. 59 Abstract 60 This document proposes a preliminary roadmap for the standardization of threshold schemes 61 for cryptographic primitives by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 62 To cover the large diversity of possible threshold schemes, as identified in the NIST Internal 63 Report (NISTIR) 8214, we tackle them in a structured way. We consider two main tracks 64 -single-device and multi-party -and within each of them we consider cryptographic 65 primitives in several possible threshold modes. The potential for real-world applications 66 is taken as an important motivating factor differentiating the pertinence of each possible 67 threshold scheme. Also, the standardization of threshold schemes needs to consider features 68 such as configurability of parameters, advanced security properties, testing and validation, 69 granularity (e.g., gadgets vs. composites) and specification detail. Overall, the organization 70 put forward enables us to solicit feedback useful to consider a variety of threshold schemes, 71 while at the same time considering differentiated standardization paths and timelines, namely 72 depending on different levels of technical and standardization challenges. This approach 73 paves the way for an effective engagement with the community of stakeholders and a 74 preparation for devising criteria for standardization and subsequent calls for contributions.
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Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.
The Computer Security Division (CSD) at the National Institute of Standards and Tech-114 nology (NIST) promotes the security of implementations and operations of cryptographic 115 primitives, such as signatures and encryption. This security depends not only on the the-116 oretical properties of the primitives, but also on the abilities to withstand attacks on their 117 implementations and to ensure authorized operations. To advance this capability, NIST 118 has initiated the Threshold Cryptography project. This project intends to drive an effort to 119 standardize threshold schemes, which enable distribution of trust placed on human operators, 120 and offer a path to prevent several single-points of failure at the technology level. 121 The most identifiable property of threshold schemes is that they enable essential security 122 properties -such as secrecy of keys, integrity of computed values, and/or availability a focus on NIST-approved primitives. This provides a number of opportunities but also 147 requires dealing with a number of challenges. 148 The main challenge is devising an effective mechanism to navigate through the large 149 diversity of possible threshold schemes, namely to organize, prioritize, and engage with the 150 stakeholders for collaboration and feedback. To this effect, this document starts by orga-151 iv NISTIR 8214A (DRAFT) TOWARDS NIST STANDARDS FOR THRESHOLD SCHEMES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES nizing the standardization effort into two different domains: single-device and multi-party. 152 As confirmed by feedback in the workshop (NTCW 2019), these domains have signif-153 icantly different challenges and involve different threshold considerations. Within each 154 domain we can then consider various base cryptographic primitives and corresponding thresh- 155 old modes of operation. Each item has their specific perceived difficulty of standardization, 156 namely based on the existence vs. absence of related base standards and on the dependence 157 on complex techniques. This makes it likely that future new standards are reached in a 158 sequence that includes first the simpler cases and only later the more complex cases. 159 Not all conceivable threshold schemes are appropriate to be standardized. A weighting 160 factor to consider is the potential for real-world applications, which to some extent may 161 also affect the level of collaboration and engagement that the stakeholders are willing to 162 undertake. An actual process of standardization also requires considering additional features, The NISTIR 8214 had already identified the need to devise criteria for eventual calls 235 for contributions for the development of new standards of threshold cryptographic schemes. 236 This document (NISTIR 8214A) is intended to devise a preliminary roadmap for the stan-237 dardization effort. A main motivation is to lay out reference rationale (complementary to 238 what the NISTIR 8214 has already done), terminology, and structure that are conducive, as 239 the project moves forward, to a precise description of the material to standardize. This is still 240 an early step that identifies at a high level the space of standardization, and a corresponding 241 variety of manners to approach possible items, with possible different timelines. On a variety of goals and paths. As the field of threshold schemes encompasses many 266 possibilities, we consider several approaches, not all of which fall within the scope of 267 developing new standards. For standardization, we are focused on threshold schemes for 268 NIST-approved cryptographic primitives. We want to enable the standardization of threshold 269 modes of implementation for these primitives, as a way to promote better best practices in 270 settings where the use of these primitives is considered to be subject to adversarial attacks 271 on the implementation or on the operation. 272 There are some simple to define threshold schemes applicable to some cryptographic 273 primitives. There are also demonstrably feasible threshold schemes whose consideration 274 still raises difficulties for the selection of the best techniques, and appropriate parameters 275 and building blocks. For some of the latter we still aim for standards, but attaining them will 276 require first establishing a clear rationale to support concrete selections. in which to deliver the new standards will become apparent as we move forward.
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A key takeaway: we want to engage with stakeholders towards an informed definition of 295 criteria for standardization of threshold schemes for cryptographic primitives. 296 1.2 A structured approach 297
The potential space of standardization 298
Since the space of threshold schemes has many dimensions, the analysis of potential items 299 for standardization benefits from a structured approach. We start by distinguishing the 300 single-device and multi-party domains. In each domain there is a potential applicability for 301 several cryptographic primitives, and each of those can be potentially implemented in various 302 modes. However, not every conceivable possibility is suitable for standardization. Figure 1 . A depiction of a variety of primitives and threshold modes across two domains a perceived difficulty need-not keep us away from advancing towards standardizing an item, 305 even if it may take longer to achieve. 306
Motivating applications 307
While there are many conceivable threshold schemes, we consider important to focus on 308 where there is a high need and high potential for adoption. An overarching motivation in 309 this effort is developing the ability to distribute trust in operations, and increasing resistance 310 against attacks on implementations, of NIST-approved cryptographic primitives, since they 311 already underpin the security of many real systems. Several potential applications can benefit 312 directly from the threshold properties enabled in implementations of these cryptographic 313 primitives. We can benefit in learning from stakeholders about more concrete applications. 314
Items across two tracks 315
As a main organization level, we consider two separate standardization tracks -one per 316 domain (single-device and multi-party). The two domains differ substantially in system 317 model, so the separation in tracks allows us to better differentiate various concurrent 318 approaches of standardization. 319 For each track we are interested in organizing possible items (primitive/mode) for 320 standardization. Some of the default potential primitives to consider for thresholdization sharing) that may appear across several threshold schemes, as well as improving the security 338 analysis and the simplicity of specification. 339
Development phases 340
We intend to drive the standardization project in phases of devising criteria for calls for con-341 tributions, evaluating proposed contributions, and writing documentation for new standards. 342 Standardization items with different development needs may be organized into different 343 tailored calls for contributions and corresponding timelines. This improves collaboration 344 with a set of stakeholders interested in a variety of standardization items and challenges. 345 Expected new standards and guidelines may include reference definitions (e.g., for secret 346 sharing), algorithms/techniques for threshold implementations, and security profiles for 347 validation/certification. The resulting documentation may span a variety of formats, includ-348 ing addenda to existing standards (e.g., a simple threshold mode of operation), and new 349 standalone documents (e.g., describing new complex techniques and analysis). 350
Feedback from stakeholders 351
To drive an open and transparent standardization process, the several phases present oppor-352 tunities for public feedback. Currently, we are particularly interested in the following topics: To organize the potential space of standardization of threshold schemes, we start by dis-370 tinguishing two domains: single-device and multi-party. The single-device domain is 371 associated with a rigidity of configuration of components, strictly defined physical bound-372 aries, and a dedicated communication network. Conversely, the multi-party domain intends 373 to enable modularized patching of components (e.g., repairing newly found bugs in exist-374 ing components, or even entirely replacing old components by new ones) and may allow 375 dynamic configurations of the parties in a protocol (possibly decided by an administrative 376 authority). The multi-party case may also require solving problems related to distributed 377 systems, such as byzantine agreement (consensus). 378 The two domains share common features with respect to certain threshold elements, and 379 some aspects may be cross-domain applicable. For example, secret-sharing as a technique 380 is often a basic component applicable to both domains. Furthermore, the two domains can 381 also be applied hierarchically, such as in a multi-party threshold implementation where each 382 party is itself a thresholdized single-device. 383
Primitives 384
In the scope of this standardization endeavor, the [cryptographic] primitive layer is a main 385 aspect of characterization of an item for thresholdization. We distinguish several primitives 386 (e.g., key-generation vs. encryption vs. decryption) that are often associated within the same 387 conventional scheme (e.g., "encryption scheme"). This separation allows modularizing dis-388 tinct single-points of failure, which may be considered differently across application settings. 389 For example, the ability to avoid a dealer of a secret key (i.e., having a dealerless scheme) 390 may be a desirable feature for some application scenarios, but we do not see a dealer as an in-391 herent shortcoming of a threshold scheme. Therefore, the need for threshold key-generation 392 should be considered separately from the need for threshold signing, decryption or encipher-393 ing. In Section 4 we focus on some NIST-approved algorithms defined in Federal Informa-394 tion Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publications in Computer Security (SP 800). 395 Overall, these include concrete instantiations for: signing, decryption (within a public-key 396 encryption (PKE) scheme), enciphering/deciphering, and key generation (including RNG). 397 The process of developing new standards must include establishing a clear rationale to 398 support concrete selections. Therefore, it is likely that the first new published standards will 399 stem from simple techniques capable of thresholdizing already NIST-approved algorithms. 400 One probable example, simple and concrete, is that of a threshold version of RSA signing or 401 decryption, where the private RSA key is initially secret-shared across several parties. This 402 can be instantiated in a n-out-of-n or even k-out-of-n manner. When a cryptographic oper-403 ation is required, each party individually computes something with their secret share, and 404 later the outputs are combined, without ever combining together the shares that would enable 405 5 Before thresholdization, the conventional paradigm of interest is one where a client requests 427 an operation from a cryptographic module, as depicted in Figure 2a . The client first sends to 428 the module a request with some input, e.g., a plaintext p for encryption or for signing, or a 429 ciphertext c for decryption; then the client receives back the reply with the intended output, 430 e.g., a ciphertext block c = AES K (p), or a signature σ = ECDSA K (p), or a decrypted 431 plaintext p = RSA K (c), where K denotes the secret/private key. 432 At a high level, we consider a similar paradigm for threshold schemes, with respect to 433 a client, with some input, requesting that some entity processes a cryptographic primitive. 434 However, as a fundamental difference, the entity receiving and processing the request and 435 outputting its result is a threshold entity, which is in fact a composite of components (either 436 multiple parties, or a single-device with several components) enabling a threshold property 437 for some security property. In the perspective of the client, the threshold entity can still be 438 abstracted as a cryptographic module (and in some cases may even be indistinguishable from 439 a conventional one), although possibly with some additional sophistication in the interface 440 and/or on how to interpret the input and output. 441 We define the threshold mode as a level of characterization used to distinguish properties 442 of the threshold scheme in the perspective of the client. Note: the meaning of "mode" here • auditability -whether or not the client can prove that an obtained output was 454 produced by a threshold scheme (e.g., identifying k components with registered 455 identities in some public-key infrastructure). 456 Other threshold mode aspects may be considered along the standardization process. We denote a mode as auditable if the client is able to verify and prove to a third party that 502 the obtained result was generated from a threshold execution. This property is for example 503 obvious in a signature defined as a concatenation of signatures, since the client can later 504 show several signed components. Perhaps less obvious, but quite useful, is the case of 505 [concise] multi-signatures whose size is independent of the number of signing parties, and 506 whose verification is similar to that of the non-threshold signature. These schemes define 507 a procedure whereby the client determines an 'equivalent' public-key corresponding to the 508 combination/aggregation of keys of the involved parties, such that a successful signature 509 verification based on the derived public key implies that the several parties have participated. 
Interchangeability 518
We call a mode interchangeable if the input and output communication of the client is 519 as in the conventional implementation primitive. This implies in particular the use of a 520 not-shared-IO mode. It is worth noticing that there may be not-shared-IO modes that are not 521 interchangeable. This happens for example if the output (not secret-shared) is authenticated 522 by all participating parties (e.g., via signatures vouching for the correct output), which the 523 client needs to parse to decide on the correctness of the output, but which are themselves 524 not part of the final output. The selection of items (primitive-mode) of interest for standardization should consider 527 potential applications taking advantage of threshold schemes for cryptographic primitives. 528 This can help foresee potential deployment scenarios and be useful to tailor future calls for 529 contributions. It can also help characterize the set of stakeholders potentially interested in 530 providing contributions to the standardization effort. Motivation may come from: 531 • Deployed applications, making use of threshold schemes, despite lack of standards 532 (or NIST standards) -the development of new standards can promote best practices 533 and interoperability in a field with already concretely demonstrated use-cases. 534 • Potential applications, whose deployment would be facilitated by new standards 535 for threshold schemes. Particularly, for widely used NIST-approved cryptographic 536 (key-based) primitives, we consider that a default motivation for thresholdization is 537 the ability to distribute trust across several operators.
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A strong motivation for achieving threshold properties in a cryptosystem implementation 539 is to reduce its susceptibility to single points of failure. These failures can often affect 540 a combination of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Correspondingly, threshold 541 schemes can be designed to enhance a combination of properties, often with tradeoffs. 542 Usually, some form of secret sharing or distributed key generation is employed in order to 543 initially distribute trust, across multiple parties or components, on the protection of a secret. 544 Other threshold schemes can then retain this distribution of trust while the shared key is 545 used to perform cryptographic operations. 546 In the multi-party domain, the distribution of shares across multiple parties can enable re-547 moving single points of failure of availability by not requiring all parties to be present, of con-548 fidentiality by requiring a greater number of colluding parties to find the key, and of integrity 549 by implementing robust techniques that detect and address faults from malicious parties. 550 In the single-device domain the goal is also to prevent key-leakage, e.g., from exploita-551 tion by side-channel and fault-injection attacks, and can include improving integrity and 552 availability. A threshold circuit design can prevent the secret key from being in an identifiable 553 location, thereby making its leakage much more difficult. For example, certain exploits may 554 then require collecting a number of traces that is exponential in the number of secret shares. 555 For the multi-party domain, we focus on applications in the active model, where cor-556 rupted parties can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification. As such, we consider 557 enabling verification of correctness of a produced output (or contributed share). For the 558 single-device domain there is also interest in exploring schemes with active security, but 559 we also see value in developing passively secure schemes against key-leakage. This section describes at a high level some technical aspects required for threshold schemes 566 for primitives and modes subject to standardization. Since the two domains(multi-party and 567 single-device) correspond to substantially different implementation scenarios, we also refer 568 to their corresponding processes as different standardization tracks. Furthermore, also within 569 each domain, we briefly describe issues that may potentially differentiate items in terms of 570 being considered simple vs. more complex, which in turn hints at different standardization 571 timelines and paths. 572 We put a stronger initial emphasis on obtaining threshold versions of NIST-approved 573 conventional primitives. Some threshold schemes are simple, originating from well de-574 fined techniques already based on properties of the underlying cryptographic primitive. 575 Other cases may require more complex techniques, e.g., generation, use and verification 576 of correlated-randomness in the single-device domain, and building blocks from secure 577 multiparty computation in the multi-party domain. 578 Note. Some trivial threshold schemes are left out of the scope of the following discussion. 579 For example, we ignore threshold schemes based solely on trivial concatenation (e.g., of 580 signatures), or nesting (e.g., of encryption, in a cascade mode), or of repetition from multiple 581 implementations of approved conventional primitives implemented with independent keys. 582 Conversely, a related but within scope case is that of multi-signatures, which, despite being 583 usable in a setting with multiple independent (public/private) keys pairs, enable producing 584 concise signatures with size independent of the number of participants. 585 We do not assume the following lists to be exhaustive. RSA signing. The essential challenge for producing a threshold RSA signature is in thresh-589 oldizing the modular exponentiation, which needs the secret key and the hashed-and-encoded 590 plaintext as input. The hashing-and-encoding can be performed by the client, or by a proxy, 591 or (if it is not a problem to leak the clear plaintext) by the components of the threshold entity. 592 We focus on obtaining a not-shared-IO mode. The shared-I mode may also be of interest, 593 case in which the hash-and-encode is performed by the client, to avoid threshold hashing. 594 RSA decryption. We consider the interchangeable mode, which is essentially the same as 595 considered for signatures, except that the input is a ciphertext and the output is a (possibly 596 encoded) plaintext. Since the plaintext is the usual object of confidentiality concerns, for 597 the decryption operation we also envision as potentially relevant the shared-O mode, i.e., 598 as an enhanced way of preventing leakage of sensitive data. Key generation for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). For EdDSA and ECDSA sig-609 natures, the secret key is a multiplicative factor (in elliptic curve notation) that leads a public 610 generator into the public key. The generation of secret keys for the mentioned elliptic-curve 611 signatures can be easily performed from independent random shares. To ensure that each 612 party ends with an actual random share, the distributed key generation may also include 613 multiparty coin-flipping and commitments to the shares held by every party. RSA key-generation. Threshold modes of interest for RSA key-generation require mul-616 tiple parties jointly computing a public modulus without any threshold set learning anything 617 secret about the prime factors, along with all parties learning secret shares of the secret 618 decryption/signing key d. This can be achieved based on secure multi-party computation, 619 and there are implementations that demonstrate its feasibility. 620 ECDSA signature. A technical difficulty in threshold ECDSA is in jointly computing 621 a secret sharing of a multiplicative inverse of an additively secret shared value. This is 622 less straightforward than a simple homomorphic computation (e.g., as in the case of thresh-623 old RSA), but can nonetheless be feasibly performed based on state-of-the-art techniques. 624 We are interested in the not-shared-IO mode, possibly simultaneously auditable. Being a 625 signature, the shared-I mode may also be of interest. 
Threshold numbers 713
We typically consider thresholds based on k-out-of-n Shamir secret sharing, possibly with 714 variable k and n across the lifetime of the scheme. The n-out-of-n case with static n may 715 also be relevant, when significantly more efficient. It is important to identify the proportion 716 of dishonest parties (e.g., dishonest minority, all-but-one dishonest) that is allowed for each 717 security property of interest, and whether threshold values are static or dynamic. 718
Rejuvenation of components 719
In several application settings of threshold schemes, the ability to support rejuvenation 720 of components is essential. Rejuvenations can be proactive or reactive, and parallel or 721 sequential. In the multi-party domain, a rejuvenation may include an actual replacement of We want to take advantage of the clarity provided by ideal functionalities, or a defined 776 interface and comprehensive set of security properties. These can be used for defining the 777 threshold modes being sought, and the properties that the corresponding protocols need to 778 satisfy. However, they are not the final goal in terms of standardization, but only a logical 779 abstraction on the way. The main goal of the initial phase (and of this document) is to provide a structured approach 805 (Sections 2 and 3) for tackling the high-dimensional space of potential threshold schemes 806 for standardization. This allows an initial identification of possible standardization items 807 (Section 4), at a high level, with some discussion on several paths to follow concurrently. 808 The roadmap also identifies important features (Section 5) to be considered down the line, 809 to be further specified in subsequent phases. . automated testing and validation of implementations (see also Section 5.1); 822 10. disclosure and licensing of intellectual property. 823 The above items are important factors to take in consideration, but are not themselves 824 a specification of criteria. In fact, several of them should remain as useful topics of future 825 discussion, besides being recalled here for the purpose of soliciting feedback about them. 826 The goal of phase 2 is to issue criteria, refined per standardization item. However, such 827 criteria will only emerge after consideration of feedback from stakeholders, and may happen 828 with different timelines for different items. Furthermore, certain aspects have a life span 829 that goes beyond the initial (future) issuance of criteria. This is for example the case of 830 performing benchmarks, collecting reference implementations developed by the community, 831 and developing testing and validation procedures. The development of these continues after 832 the selection of concrete threshold schemes in subsequent phases. 833 Section 7 adds more notes about expected feedback useful for a reflection on criteria. 834
Phase 3 -Collect and evaluate contributions 835
The word "contributions" has a broad meaning. The type of expected contributions can 836 significantly vary with the technical difficulties associated with the intended standardization 837 item. Based on this, we envision different initial types of calls (here described at high level): For some simple items, as well as for simple gadgets (e.g., secret sharing), a contribution 842 call may simply ask for complementary feedback on a base scheme proposal by NIST. Some 843 simple items may nonetheless also involve an actual call for proposals of threshold schemes. 844 We do not envision these cases as competitions, as it is more likely that different proposals 845 share common features and we may want to adapt features for some final protocols. 846 The technically more challenging items may require complex choices about their internal 847 gadgets and their composition. The process must enable an adequate evaluation and selection 848 across a wide span of possible protocols for the same intended functionality. In this case, a 849 multi-stage contribution process is appropriate, starting with a request for information and 850 progressing to concrete protocol proposals over time. 851 We are also interested in research results about useful threshold schemes that are out 852 of scope for this standardization effort. For the multi-party setting, this includes schemes for We will try to engage with the research community in some appropriate manner (e.g., 858 dedicated workshops), to keep informed about the state-of-the-art in the corresponding fields. In this section we describe at a high level several conceivable applications that take advantage 954 of threshold schemes for cryptographic primitives. This is intended as an aid to identify, 955 motivate and select concrete items of interest for standardization. The hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms has gained a significant and grow-958 ing stake in the industry. Large amounts of sensitive data are now processed in hardware, 959 which creates the need for faster implementations. Most semiconductor manufacturers have 960 incorporated dedicated hardware accelerators for cryptography that perform orders of mag-961 nitude faster than software implementations. Even though asymmetric algorithms, such as 962 RSA and even ECC digital signatures, can be implemented by a hardware accelerator, in or-963 der to reduce the processing time of private key operations, these algorithms are not suitable 964 for severely constrained devices in the Internet of Things (IoT), due to the significant re-965 sources required, which results in low performance on such platforms. As a result, many IoT 966 devices have only hardware engines for symmetric cryptography primitives, such as AES. 967 At the same time, conventional hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms 968 have created significant problems in terms of side-channel leakage. Traditional techniques 969 for leakage mitigation are costly and ad hoc. Such implementations are also susceptible 970 to fault attacks. In this context we ask: what type of algorithm is the most widely used in 971 hardware and stands to gain the most from a standard mechanism for mitigating leakage 972 and/or fault attacks, if threshold schemes for it are developed and standardized? 973 Symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms such as block ciphers and message authenti-974 cation codes tend to be difficult to protect, Furthermore, the leakage pattern of hardware 975 implementations of is vastly different from what emanates from software implementations. 976 Glitches and other physical effects result in stronger leakage for hardware implementations 977 of symmetric cryptographic algorithms (compared to software ones). Based on this, for 978 the single-device track we propose to focus on hardware implementations of block-cipher 979 algorithms (AES strongly preferred) and develop standards for threshold schemes to mitigate 980 the risks of side-channel leakage and/or fault attacks.
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A.2 Protection of secrets at rest 982
Most cryptographic applications involve a secret, which if revealed to an adversary results in 983 a security failure. For example: a secret key corresponding to a public certificate can decrypt 984 encrypted messages whose content was intended only for the key owner; a secret key from 985 a crypto-currency can be used to spend the original funds of the owner; the secret signing 986 key of a certificate authority (CA) can sign certificates as the CA. The key also needs to be 987 available to the legitimate user -losing the key may imply losing a digital identity, in the 988 case of a signing key, or losing access to funds, in the case of a crypto-currency private key. 989 
